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Justice John Paul Stevens: An Initial Assessment 
Branch Y. Ball* and Thomas M. Uhlman** 
Compared to other recent nominations to the Supreme 
Court, the selection and confirmation of John Paul Stevens was 
relatively uneventful. One of the five men seriously considered for 
the position, he was nominated by President Ford on November 
28, 1975, only sixteen days after Justice Douglas tendered his 
resignation. Confirmation hearings began in the Senate shortly 
thereafter. Following three days of routine testimony,' the Senate 
Judiciary Committee unanimously endorsed the Stevens nomina- 
tion with less than a minute's debate. Over the next six days he 
was roundly praised on the floor of the full Chamber and then 
confirmed as the 10lst Justice of the Supreme Court by an over- 
whelming vote of ninety-eight to zero.2 
Several factors contributed to the relative ease of the Stevens 
nomination. First, he possessed the criteria established by Presi- 
dent Ford for choosing Douglas' successor: relative youth (middle 
aged), competence in law, and in tegr i t~ .~  Fifty-five a t  the time of 
his nomination, Stevens graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the 
University of Chicago, attended Northwestern University Law 
School where he edited the law review and graduated first in his 
class, clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, became 
a partner in a prominent Chicago firm, and received high marks 
as a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.' 
* B.A., 1973, Oregon State University; M.A., 1978, University of Missouri-St. Louis. 
Mr. Ball specializes in the area of judical biography. 
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis. B.A., 
1968, University of Rochester; M.A., 1971, Ph.D., 1975, University of North Carolina at  
Chapel Hill. Dr. Uhlman is the recipient of the 1976 Edward S. Corwin Award given by 
the American Political Association for the best doctoral dissertation during the previous 
two years in constitutional law, courts, or the judical process. 
1. See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on 
Nomination of John Paul Stevens, of Illinois, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 
Before the Senate Judicary Committee]. 
2. 121 CONG. REC. 39883, 40477, 40895-96, 41123-28 (1975). 
3. Matthews, Ford Lists His Criteria for Picking Court Justice, St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, Nov. 16, 1975, at 2A, col. 1. 
4. For a more detailed analysis of Justice Stevens' background and career, see Elsas- 
ser, Ford Nominates Judge in Chicago to Supreme Court, Chi. Tribune, Nov. 29, 1975, a t  
1, col. 1; McFadden, The President's Choice: John Paul Stevens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 
1975, a t  1, col. 6; Rich, Ford Picks Chicago Jurist, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1975, a t  Al, col. 
1. 
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Strong support within the Ford administration and the legal 
profession also greatly facilitated the nomination. Attorney Gen- 
eral Levi was probably instrumental in bringing forth Stevens as 
a possible nominee. The two had come to know each other well 
at the University of Chicago School of Law where Levi had been 
dean and Stevens had taught occasionally. Levi's enthusiastic 
support was evident as soon as the nomination was made public. 
"For the many who know Judge Stevens and for those who will 
come to know him, I am sure it will be realized that the nomina- 
tion is a commitment to e~cellence."~ Typical of the remarks 
made of the Stevens nomination was one by Jerome Kurland, 
professor of law at the University of Chicago. "He's a first-rate 
lawyer, a first-rate judge and a first-rate person-more than that 
you can't ask for."Vlaudits were also forthcoming from the 
American Bar Association's Committee on the Federal Judiciary 
which stated that Stevens "meets high standards of professional 
competence, judicial temperament and integrity-the commit- 
tee's highest evaluation. "' 
Finally, Justice Stevens maintained a low political profile 
throughout his professional career and, as a result, encountered 
little opposition on ideological grounds. While on the court of 
appeals he rarely appeared in nonlegal circles and once had even 
delayed for two years an address to a Northwestern alumni group 
for fear of making some improper public pronouncement. A prom- 
inent Chicago attorney characterized Stevens as "almost a non- 
political animal? It is not surprising that when Stevens' name 
was put forward, his political views were virtually unknown to 
legalists throughout the country and to most Senators on Capitol 
~ i 1 1 . ~  
Clearly, Justice Stevens' intelligence, integrity, and career 
accomplishments contributed greatly to his successful and rela- 
tively easy confirmation to the Supreme Court. But he also bene- 
fited materially from his noncontroversial tenure as a court of 
appeals judge and his abstention from partisan political activity. 
Unpleasant memories of the Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell 
nominations made both the White House and the Senate eager 
to avoid a similar confrontation over the Douglas replacement. 
5. Isaacs, Specialist in Antitrust Law, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1975, at A5, col. 1 (quot- 
ing Attorney General Levi) . 
6. McFadden, supra note 4, at 1, 14, cols. 7, 4 (quoting Jerome Kurland). 
7. Rich, supra note 4, at A l ,  col. 5. 
8. Isaacs, supra note 5, at A5, col. 3. 
9. See Senate Reaction Is Limited by Recess, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, at 14, col. 
3. 
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With Stevens they were able to do so easily. He possessed all the 
necessary prerequisites for the position in addition to having pow- 
erful supporters and only token opposition. 
The same factors that led to his successful confirmation also 
had a significant unintended consequence. Because of his impec- 
cable credentials and apolitical career, much less was known 
about Justice Stevens' attitudes and beliefs than was known 
about those of other Justices a t  comparable stages in their car- 
eers. During the confirmation hearings he carefully avoided de- 
tailed answers to specific questions about his judicial philosphy 
and was not pressed by his questioners.1° Attempts by journalists 
and legal scholars to place an ideological label on Stevens were 
just as inconclusive. He has been called a centrist, a moderate, a 
moderate with conservative leanings, a centrist with progressive 
leanings, and a conservative. l1 Others have found Stevens diffi- 
cult, if not impossible to categorize.12 
This Article will remove much of the uncertainty about Ste- 
vens' political views by systematically assessing his voting record 
during his tenure on both the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
and the Supreme Court. This ideological assessment is made by 
comparing the votes cast by Justice Stevens in economic and 
personal liberty cases during his seven-year judicial career to 
those of his colleagues on both courts. Because similar issues have 
repeatedly arisen in the approximately 700 cases in which he has 
participated, Stevens' general political attitudes and values can 
be inferred from his voting patterns over time. 
While not substituting for the systematic analysis that was 
lacking at the time of his confirmation, this Article looks beyond 
Stevens' credentials and qualifications to explore performance. 
Moreover, after nearly two years on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Stevens has begun to establish a record. This record will be com- 
pared to his past decisionmaking as well as to the records of his 
judicial colleagues. The result will be a better understanding of 
10. During the course of the judiciary hearings, for example, Senator Kennedy asked 
Stevens whether he would label himself an "activist" or a "strict constructionist." He 
replied, apparently satisfactorily, that he would not label himself. Hearings Before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 1, at 32. See also Siddon, Easy Senate OK 
Expected for Stevens, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 8, 1975, at 7, col. 3. 
11. Boyd, Judge Stevens-His Views on Law, Chi. Tribune, Nov. 30, 1975, at 6, col. 
3; Matthews, Decisions Indicate Nominee for Court Is a Conservative, St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, Nov. 30, 1975, at 2A, col. 1; Oelsner, Ford Chooses a Chicagoan for Supreme 
Court; Nominee Is Appeals Judge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, at 1, col. 8. 
12. See Lewis, The Stevens Nomination, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1975, at 41, col. 4; 
Oelsner, Factors in Court Choice, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,1975, at 1, col. 1; Court Nominee 
Is Hard to Label, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, Q 4, at 1, col. 3. 
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the one member of the Burger Court who remains an ideological 
enigma. 
The primary approach to be used in analyzing Stevens' per- 
formance and, in turn, his ideology is called issue voting analysis. 
His votes and those of his colleagues will be classified both by the 
principal substantive question at  issue in a large number of cases 
and by the degree of liberalism or conservatism expressed by their 
votes in each case. Used frequently in judicial research,13 the 
approach facilitates the comparison of judicial positions, patterns 
of interaction, and the values and attitudes of individual jurists. 
While not "better" than the more traditional analysis of individ- 
ual opinions in selected cases, this approach does have certain 
advantages. With cases in each subject matter area weighted 
equally, an occasional publicized vote or opinion in a "landmark" 
case will not have an inordinate influence on a Justice's overall 
position. Also, in studying voting behavior across a series of cases, 
trends become evident. This is particularly important here, where 
one objective is to contrast Stevens' positions on two separate 
courts. 
During five years of service on the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, John Paul Stevens participated in 539 cases; 534 are 
included in this analysis." After taking his seat on the Supreme 
Court in January 1976, Stevens voted in 159 cases that had been 
decided with full opinions by May 1, 1977; 152 of these are exam- 
ined. l5 
13. C. Herman Pritchett in his landmark study, C. PRITCHETT, HE ROOSEVELT 
COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL P O L ~ C S  AND VALUES 1937-1947 (1948), was the first legal 
scholar to uncover regularities in Supreme Court voting patterns that could be linked to 
similar attitudes and values among the Justices. This pioneering work has been meaning- 
fully extended in a number of directions in subsequent years. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICUL BEHAVIOR (1959); Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 461; Lamb, Warren Burger and 
the Insanity Defense--Judicial Philosophy and Voting Behavior on a U.S. Court of Ap- 
peals, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 91 (1974); Loeb, Judicial Blocs and Judicial Values in Civil 
Liberties Cases Decided by the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 146 (1965); Schultz & Howard, The 
Myth of Swing Voting: An Analysis of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 798 (1975); Ulmer, Voting Blocs and "Access" to the Supreme Court: 1947-1956 
Terms, 16 JURIMETRICS J. 6 (1975). 
14. These cases may be found in volumes 435-527 of the Federal Reporter, Second 
Series. Three labor cases not included in the Federal Reporter may be found in volumes 
64, 68, and 69 of CCH Labor Cases. A complete list is also available from the authors at 
the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Cases dealing with jurisdictional rather than sub- 
stantive issues were excluded along with cases heard by Stevens sitting alone. 
15. See Appendix I. These cases can be found in volumes 423-30 of the United States 
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Both sets of cases were divided into two broad categories; 
those dealing with economic matters comprise one group,16 and 
personal liberty suits comprise the other." While other classifica- 
tory schemes are possible,18 the one adopted here is patterned 
after similar, widely accepted efforts by leading scholars in the 
field? The primary advantage of this partition is its capacity to 
distinguish among these major and distinct types of policy- 
relevant cases while retaining comprehensiveness within each 
category. As a result, judicial differences on broadly defined ideo- 
logical positions can be compared across the variety of specific 
economic and personal liberty questions that are considered by 
the courts. At times classification was not easy, particularly when 
several substantive issues were raised simultaneously. After read- 
ing the opinions in each case, however, a relatively straightfor- 
ward judgment was usually possible based on the primary thrust 
of the majority opinion. 
After the cases were divided into categories, liberalism- 
conservatism indices were developed as general indicators of judi- 
cial attitudes and values for each type of case heard before each 
court.20 Based on operational definitions of liberal and conserva- 
tive positions on most major legal questions, the indices are sum- 
mary measures and as such can be meaningfully applied across 
a number of subject matter areas. A liberal position in a case was 
defined as support for federal regulation or for the litigant who 
represented the less privileged or relatively disadvantaged social, 
economic, or political group or interest in society. Conversely, 
conservatism was operationalized as support for the party that 
Reports. Cases were excluded if they focused on jurisdictional matters, were disposed of 
via an order, or were decided by a Justice sitting alone on an appeals bench. 
16. Cases in the economic category present substantive issues concerning: bank- 
ruptcy, business, consumer interests, environmental protection, insurance claims, labor- 
management disputes, patents, copyrights, antitrust, personal injury, social security 
claims, stockholders' claims, taxation, landlord-tenant controversies, unemployment 
compensation, and federal-state or state-state economic disputes. 
17. Cases in the personal liberty category present substantive issues concerning: 
criminal law suits, criminal defendant petitions, and civil rights litigation involving ethnic 
or racial minorities, aliens, or conscientious objectors. 
18. See, e.g., Ulmer & Stookey, Nixon's Legacy to the Supreme Court: A Statistical 
Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 331 (1975) (criminal cases and noncri- 
minal cases in which government is a litigant). 
19. The first such classification was developed by Pritchett and has been utilized 
with slight modification by Schubert and Goldman, among others. See C. PRITCHETT, HE 
ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAI POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947, a t  253-63 (2d ed. 
1969); G. SCHUBERT, HE JUDICIAL MIND 97-157 (1965); Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U .  CIN. L. REV. 635,642 (1973). 
20. These indices complement but do not replace detailed analyses of judicial posi- 
tions on specific legal questions. 
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enjoyed the relative social, economic, or political advantage or 
favor in each case.21 For example, in a landlord-tenant contro- 
versy (an economic case) a vote in favor of the landlord was 
classified as a generally conservative position while support for 
the tenant was considered liberal. Similarly, a vote against a 
party making a civil rights claim was treated as conservative 
while a positionin favor of this type of personal liberty issue was 
considered liberal? 
Within this classificatory scheme, values were assigned to 
Justice Stevens' votes as well as those of his colleagues sitting 
with him on a case. The author of the majority opinion usually 
received a score of either +1 or -1 depending upon whether he 
took a liberal (positive score) or conservative (negative score) 
position in the case.23 When the author of the majority split on 
the issue, for example, by upholding a personal liberty claim in 
part and denying it in part, he received a score of 0. Judges 
joining the author of the majority opinion received the same score 
(+ 1 for a liberal stance, -1 for a conservative position, 0 for a split 
opinion). 
Judges concurring with the majority, assuming the opinion 
was liberal, received a score of either +1.5 or +0.5 depending 
upon whether their concurrence was more or less liberal than the 
opinion of the majority. Likewise, judges concurring with the 
majority in a conservative decision received either a -1.5 or -0.5 
score. Judges concurring in a split majority opinion were assigned 
a score of either +0.5 or -0.5 depending upon whether the concur- 
rence was more or less liberal than the majority opinion.z4 Judges 
concurring in part and dissenting in part were given scores of 0. 
A dissenting judge usually received a score opposite in sign from 
that of the author of the majority opinion. Therefore, scores for 
various judges' positions in an individual case could conceivably 
range from +1.5 to -1.5. 
Some subjectivity and error are inevitable in interpreting 
judges' general ideological positions from their votes and opinions 
across a broad range of specific cases. The usefulness of the result- 
ing measure, however, far outweighs its shortcomings, and in the 
21. These definitions are derived from those developed by MacIver and Nagel. See 
R. MACIVER, THE WEB OF GOVERNMENT 162 (rev. ed. 1965); Nagel, Political Party Affilia- 
tion and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843, 846-47 (1961). 
22. Appendix II presents a complete listing of liberal and conservative positions on 
the various legal questions that came before the courts on which Stevens sat. 
23. The sign designations of liberal-positive and conservative-negative were arbitrar: 
ily assigned. 
24. Concurring opinions that could not be distinguished ideologically were assigned 
values identical to the majority opinion. 
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vast majority of cases the distinctions were clear and could be 
made without difficulty. The scale itself represents an improve- 
ment over similar efforts undertaken in the past. Goldman uti- 
lized only three categories in differentiating ideological voting on 
the United States Courts of Appeals (equivalent to + 1 (liberal), 
0 (split), -1 (conservative)); differences of opinion that motivated 
judges to author concurring opinions or separate dissents were 
ignored as the judges were grouped in one of the three primary 
categorie~.~~ When these differences of opinion based on varying 
ideological perspectives appeared in the present study, they were 
measured by adjusting scale scores in the appropriate liberal or 
conservative direction (+.5 or -.5); these adjusted scores were 
then utilized along with the more common joint opinion scores in 
computing the ideological voting average for each judge.26 
After the cases in each category were examined and values 
assigned, the scores were totaled and averaged for each judge. 
The result is a relative ranking that is useful in understanding the 
ideological complexion of both courts on which Justice Stevens 
has served, his relative position within them, and possible 
changes in his position as he moved from one court to the other. 
Except for occasional absences due to illness or disqualifica- 
tion, the same group of Justices voted with Stevens in the 152 
Supreme Court cases included in this analysis. This constancy 
makes the ideological scores for all the Justices representative 
and the comparisons among them reliable. As a group, they re- 
sponded to the same sets of facts, issues in controversy, and pub- 
lic policy questions. Unfortunately, group stability is not found 
on the court of appeals bench. Justice Stevens heard cases with 
thirty-one different judges in economic suits and thirty-six differ- 
ent jurists in personal liberty cases. Because of the varying com- 
position of circuit panels, several of these jurists sat with Stevens 
only once or twice. In order to avoid misleading conclusions based 
on a small number of cases decided in common, only judges who 
sat with Stevens a minimum of fifteen times in either economic 
or personal liberty cases are retained in the court of appeals anal- 
25. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 642; Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United 
States Courts of Appeals 1961-1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374 (1966). 
26. When actually classified, the judges' votes were coded at +1 or -1 in the majority 
of instances. In fact, the more subtle ideological distinctions reflected in separate concur- 
rences or dissents appeared, on the average, in less than 10% of the votes cast by each 
judge. When they did occur, they followed expected patterns. For example, the most 
liberal positions (+ 1.5) were embraced exclusively by judges whose overall voting averages 
were liberal. 
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ysis. After using the fifteen case cutoff, ten judges, including 
Stevens, remained in each category. 
During his tenure on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
John Paul Stevens sat on 233 panels which rendered decisions in 
economic cases. As indicated in Table 1, his ideological position 
as measured by his votes in these cases was moderate. The slight 
liberal tendency (+0.15) should be minimized because, when 
viewed from the perspective of the entire scale (+ 1.5 to -1.5), 
Stevens departs only marginally from an ideologically neutral 
position. Stevens' score in relation to those of his colleagues on 
the Seventh Circuit indicates perhaps more clearly that he was 
an economic moderate. While the "court" as a whole (more ap- 
propriately this group of ten justices) may have voted in a slightly 
liberal manner, only Judge Castle's voting average (+0.75) falls 
outside the middle third of the scale (+0.5 to -0.5). Stevens lies 
in the center of this group of economic moderates with a voting 
record nearly identical to the average of his  colleague^.^^ On the 
Supreme Court, Stevens has confronted a different collection of 
economic cases with a different group of judicial colleagues. Has 
his response varied? 
TABLE 1-Economic Cases : Average Ideo1ogica.l Vot ing Scores of 
Justice Stevens and Other  Judges on. the Seventh Circuita 
Judge Ideological Scoresb Number of Cases 
Castle 
Sprecher 
Campbelle 
Hastings 
Stevens 
Fairchild 
Pel1 
Kiley 
Cummings 
Swygert 
Court mean 
a The judges included sa t  with Stevens on a minimum of 15 cases. 
b Scores may range from +1.5 (liberal) to  -1.5 (conservative). 
c Judge Campbell was a district court judge sitting by designation. 
27. Because they comprise a major portion of the total, Justice Stevens' votes heavily 
influence the court of appeals averages in Tables 2 and 4. Nevertheless, these figures, when 
interpreted in conjunction with the individual scores, represent useful indicators of the 
general ideological complexion of the court. 
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Table 2 indicates that it has not. Based on his votes in the 
first seventy-two economic cases in which he participated as a 
Supreme Court Justice, Stevens' record is again only slightly 
removed from the midpoint of the ideological scale, and his aver- 
age (+0.18) lies well within the moderate third. While there is 
some variation among individual Justices, the voting average for 
the entire Court in economic cases (+0.10) is quite close to 
Stevens'. Individually, Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist are the 
only Justices on the conservative side of the scale's midpoint. 
Marshall, Brennan, and White are the Court's most progressive 
members, while Blackmun and Burger, in addition to Stevens, 
comprise a centrist third. In spite of this modest voting variation 
among individual Justices, the Court, like Justice Stevens, ap- 
pears to be basically moderate on economic policy. 
TABLE 2-Economic Cases  : Average  Ideological Vot ing 
Scores o f  Supreme Cour t  Justices 
Justice Ideological Scores Number of Cases 
Marshall 
Brennan 
White 
Stevens 
Blackmun 
Burger 
Stewart 
Powell 
Rehnquist 
Court mean = +0.10 
The moderate position taken by individual Justices over all 
cases may obscure significant differences among them on various 
types of economic controversies. To observe these patterns of 
agreementldisagreement, Table 3 presents the voting alignment 
among individual pairs of Justices. The top right-hand portion of 
the table indicates the frequency with which any two Justices 
voted together in the majority (++), the dissent (--), or took 
opposite positions (+- or -+). The bottom left-hand portion dis- 
plays the overall degree of voting compatibility between pairs of 
Justices; the figures are the percentages of votes cast together in 
both the majority or dissenting opinions in the economic cases.28 
28. No distinction is made between concurring and joint opinions. To facilitate pres- 
entation, the table simply indicates the general alignment of pairs of Justices in majority 
or dissenting opinions. 
TABLE 3-Vating Relationsh/ips Among Supreme 
Court Justices in Economic Cases 
MA BR WH - JPS BL BU ST PO RE 
MA 
BR 94.4 
WH 87.5 
JPS 77.8 
-
BL 81.7 
BU 81.9 
ST 71.8 
PO 76.5 
RE 70.8 
MA=Marshall, BR=Brennan, WH =White, JPS-Stevens, BL=Blackmun, 
BU=Burger, ST=Stewart, PO=Powell, RE-Rehnquist 
Upper right: +vote cast in majority 
v o t e  cast in dissent 
Lower left: percentage agreement in both majority and dissent 
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The absence of sweeping differences among the Justices over 
general economic policy first noted in Table 2 is confirmed in 
Table 3. All the Justices agree substantially more often than they 
disagree. This is not to say, however, that differences fail to 
emerge. Rates of agreement vary significantly from Brennan- 
Marshall, Burger-Blackmun, Burger-Powell, and Stewart- 
Rehnquist, who voted together over 90% of the time, to Rehn- 
quist-Brennan who.agree on less than two-thirds of their votes. 
With one exception, Justice Stevens joins with his colleagues 
between 70 and 80% of the time. In fact, he displays the smallest 
variation in agreement rates on the entire bench and is the only 
member of the Court not to vote with a fellow Justice in a t  least 
80% of the cases. Stevens' highest rates of agreement are with 
Justices White (79.2%) and Blackmun (78.9%), the two men clos- 
est to him in their overall ideological scores (Table 2). 
One interpretation of Stevens' record might be that as a new 
member of the Court he is feeling his way, waiting until he has 
gained experience to establish firm positions on economic mat- 
ters. His behavior may be contrasted to more senior Justices who 
have strongly held views on certain types of economic controver- 
sies and would therefore be in more consistent agreement or disa- 
greement when these issues are heard. Considering his court of 
appeals record, however, a more likely explanation is that as a 
true economic moderate, Justice Stevens frequently finds himself 
in agreement with both the moderatehiberal and the moder- 
ate/conservative Justices on the Court. 
This initial assessment of Justice Stevens' voting highlights 
his moderate stance on economic issues and the consistency with 
which he has maintained his position on both benches. Perhaps 
facilitating his transition to the Supreme Court is the ideological 
congruence between the two courts. Stevens confronted a strik- 
ingly similar configuration of attitudes on economic policy as he 
moved from one court to the other. In both, moderate views have 
dominated, and within both, Stevens assumed a centrist position. 
The picture of John Paul Stevens as a centrist is not mark- 
edly altered by examining his votes in personal liberty cases while 
a court of appeals judge (Table 4). However, differences do ap- 
pear when the court's general voting patterns in personal liberty 
and economic cases are contrasted. The most notable may be a 
shift from a liberal to a conservative decisionmaking trend. While 
the court as a whole, and Justice Stevens in particular, must still 
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be considered moderate rather than either conservative or liberal, 
the consistency in the voting averages may highlight what 
amounts to an ideological emphasis in both types of cases. 
TABLE 4--Personal Liberty Cases : Ave.rage Zdeoloyical 
Voting Scores of Justice Stevens and Other 
Judges on the Seventh Circuita 
Judge Ideological Scoresb Number of Cases 
-- -- 
Castle 
Fairchild 
Kiley 
Sprecher 
Hastings 
Swygert 
Stevens 
Cummings 
Pell 
Duffy 
Court mean 
a The judges included sat with Stevens on a minimum of 15 cases. 
b Scores may range from +1.5 (liberal) to -1.5 (conservative). 
If such an ideological emphasis exists, it is more pronounced 
in personal liberty cases. Justice Stevens is the fourth most con- 
servative in this ranking with an average score of -0.37. All of the 
judges are on the conservative side of the scale compared to eight 
out of ten on the liberal side in economic cases. Two judges, Pell 
and Duffy, fall in the conservative third of the personal liberty 
scale while only one judge is within the liberal third of the eco- 
nomic scale. Finally, the average score for the court as a whole is 
nearly twice as far from the ideological midpoint on the scale in 
personal liberty cases (-0.29) than in economic cases (+0.15). 
These patterns may mean that while moderate positions predom- 
inate on both types of issues, judges on the Seventh Circuit 
would, for example, be somewhat more likely to decide cases 
against the criminal defendant or civil liberties claimant than 
they would be to decide in favor of a consumer, employee, or 
insurance claimant. 
On the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens' relative position on 
personal liberty cases has changed slightly (Table 5). Though his 
score is still negative (-0.07), his votes rank him as the third most 
liberal member of the Burger Court. Togethe~ with Justice Stew- 
art, Stevens has remained essentially unaligned in the decision 
of all eighty personal liberty cases, relatively far removed ideolog- 
ically from the liberals Marshall and Brennan, the conservative 
Rehnquist, and the moderate/conservative Burger. 
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TABLE ti-Personal L iber t y  Cases  : Average  Ideologicct 1 
Voting Scores o f  Supreme Court  Justices 
Justice Ideological Scores Number of Cases 
Marshall 
Brennan 
Stevens 
Stewart 
White 
Blackmun 
Powell 
Burger 
Rehnquist 
Court mean = -0.09 
The Court as a whole has been more sharply divided over 
personal liberty than economic questions. This is evident initi- 
ally in the wide range of average scores (+0.62 to -0.64) and by 
the three Justices (Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist) whose 
voting averages fall outside the middle or moderate third of the 
scale. These intracourt divisions are further highlighted by the 
patterns of agreement/disagreement among pairs of individual 
Justices (Table 6). 
Voting agreement is extremely high among several Justices. 
Only once in seventy-seven cases did Marshall and Brennan fail 
to agree whether in the majority or in the dissent. Likewise, in 
the vast majority of cases, Burger and Rehnquist (88.8%), Stew- 
art and Powell (88.8%), and White and Blackmun (87.3%) voted 
together. This ideological compatibility stands in sharp contrast 
to the frequent disagreement between the Court's liberal mem- 
bers (Marshall and Brennan) and conservative Rehnquist and 
moderate/conservative Burger. Agreement among these various 
pairs of Justices of between 40 and 51% is far lower than the 
lowest agreement rate in economic cases. 
Stevens' moderate position in personal liberty cases is illus- 
trated by his consistent rate of agreement with his colleagues on 
both ends of the Court's ideological spectrum. While personal 
liberty conservatives disagree with their liberal counterparts 
more often than not, Justice Stevens has aligned himself nearly 
equally with both factions on the Court; he voted with Marshall 
and Brennan as well as Burger and Rehnquist between 65 and 
68% of the time. Stevens again demonstrates the most consistent 
level of agreement with the rest of his colleagues, ranging from a 
high of 78.8% with Justice Powell to a low of only 64.9% with 
Justice Marshall. His most frequent dissents have come with the 
TABLE 6-Voting Relationships Among Supre,me Court 
Justices in Personal Liberty Cases 
MA BR - JPS ST WH BL PO BU RE 
MA 
BR 98.7 
JPS 64.9 
7
ST 68.8 
WH 62.3 
BL 59.7 
PO 59.7 
BU 50.6 
RE 40.3 
MA=Marshall, BR=Brennan, JPS =Stevens, ST=Stewart, WH =White 
BL=Blackmun, PO=Powell, BU =Burger, RE=Rehnquist 
Upper right: +vote cast in majority 
-vote cast in dissent 
Lower left: percentage agreement in both majority and dissent 
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liberals Marshall and Brennan while he has yet to dissent with 
Burger and has done so only once with White, Blackmun, and 
Powell. 
Even though Stevens' decisions on the circuit court level 
were slightly more conservative than his Supreme Court votes in 
personal liberty matters, no real liberal trend is indicated. Some 
of the difference in his absolute scores on both courts may be due 
to the types of personal liberty cases heard. Because of the nature 
of the claims and/or the claimants, it may have been more diffi- 
cult to take a liberal position on cases heard by the Seventh 
Circuit. Although his relative position changed somewhat, he has 
remained within the broadly defined center of both courts. In 
sum, any slight ideological shift in personal liberty cases by Ste- 
vens is clearly overshadowed by both an overall position of mod- 
eration within each court and frequent alignment with the two 
sharply divided ideological factions on the Burger Court. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
At the time of his confirmation, John Paul Stevens may well 
have been considered to be a conservative or a progressive by 
some of those who scrutinized his credentials. However, a system- 
atic examination of his judicial performance reveals that these 
labels were as inappropriate two years ago as they are today. 
Alternative assessments of Stevens as a moderate with liberal or 
conservative leanings are also wide of the mark, as his votes in 
over 700 cases fail to reveal a significant or sustained trend in one 
ideological direction or another. While perhaps not generating as 
much interest or attention as a more exotic political label, moder- 
ation and moderation alone appears to be the most accurate char- 
acterization of Justice Stevens' attitudes toward economic and 
personal liberty questions. In five years of service on the court of 
appeals and two years on the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens has 
maintained a centrist position with a marked degree of consist- 
ency. 
If his moderate positions enable Stevens to bridge the ideo- 
logical gap between left and right, particularly in personal liberty 
cases, the Court as a whole will be strengthened. Based on his 
record to date, this outcome appears increasingly probable. Ste- 
vens has passed through his initial period of adjustment without 
becoming closely aligned with either an ideological bloc or an- 
other Justice on the Court. In all likelihood, Stevens will continue 
to utilize his considerable legal skills in conjunction with his inde- 
pendence and political moderation to become a unifying force on 
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the Court in the years ahead. In cases where compromise is not 
possible and the Court remains closely divided, Stevens' moder- 
ate views will often enable him to cast the determinative vote. His 
pivotal position as a "swing" Justice may arise frequently in the 
future, particularly if the votes of President Carter's initial ap- 
pointments to the Court offset those of the more conservative 
Justices chosen during the Nixon years. 
Misperceptions about Stevens' political ideology a t  the time 
of his selection highlight a serious shortcoming in the confirma- 
tion process. While infrequently acknowledged candidly, a candi- 
date's general ideological or political outlook is an important fac- 
tor in a Senator's decision to support or oppose conf i rmat i~n.~~ 
While perhaps justified on other grounds, both opposition and 
support have been shown to be strongly related to the congruence 
or incongruence between a Senator's own ideology and his percep- 
tions of the candidate's ideology? Depending upon the source in 
Stevens' case, these perceptions may well have been wrong. 
Major political decisions such as a vote on a Supreme Court 
appointment should not remain based, as they have been, on 
impressions, partial truths, or misinformation derived from a 
hasty or incomplete sampling of a nominee's prior public record. 
A comprehensive examination of the entire record emphasizing 
the general political factors that will, a t  least in part, determine 
a Senator's vote is a necessary supplement to the traditional ana- 
lyses of education, career, and professional  credential^.^' For Jus- 
tice Stevens, it would have served as an accurate and useful pre- 
dictor of his initial Supreme Court voting record. 
Would this information, if known a t  Stevens' confirmation 
hearings, have changed the ultimate outcome? Given the political 
circumstances a t  the time, almost certainly not. Partisan differ- 
ences between a Republican White House and a heavily Demo- 
29. The same factors are considered by the President, the Attorney General, and their 
staffs in making Supreme Court as well as most lower court nominations. See J. SCHMID- 
HAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT: ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES AND PROCEDURES (1960); Black, 
A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nom.inees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970); 
Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts of Appeals, 1967 WIS. L. 
REV. 186; Goldman, Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower 
Federal Courts, 18 W .  POL. Q. 755 (1965). 
30. D. ROHDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 98-117 (1976). These 
findings indicate that Senators already heed Professor Black's suggestion and scrutinize 
Supreme Court nominees on ideological grounds. Black, supra note 29. 
31. Although recent Supreme Court nominees have not all been judges, they have all 
had extensive records of public service. Therefore, similar examinations for candidates 
without prior judicial experience should also be possible using different indicators of 
attitudes and beliefs. 
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cratic Senate, the furor generated by previous nominations, and 
fears expressed by some over a sharp swing to the right by the 
Burger Court made a political moderate with exceptional creden- 
tials such as Stevens the ideal choice. In the future, as in the 
immediate past, however, political necessities may not mesh with 
a nominee's qualifications so nicely. If so, there may well be a 
compelling need to accurately assess ideology as well as legal 
craftsmanship and integrity in evaluating a Supreme Court nom- 
ination. Hopefully, information will be available to make such an 
assessment possible. 
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A.  Economic Cases 
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 
682 (1976) (corporations, international law). 
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Starnes, 425 U.S. 637 
(1976) (corporations). 
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (government regulation of busi- 
ness). 
Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB,  429 U.S. 298 (1977) 
(labor-management) . 
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax  Commission, 429 U.S. 
318 (1977) (government regulation of business). 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat,  Inc., 429 U.S. 477 
(1977) (antitrust). 
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (taxation). 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) 
(labor-management) . 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.  199 (1977) (social security). 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (social security). 
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (antitrust). 
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (government 
regulation of business). 
Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976) (government regulation of 
business). 
City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Association of  
Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976) (labor-management). 
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 
(1976) (government regulation of business). 
City of  Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977) 
(federal-state) . 
Colorado River Water  Conservation District v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (government regulation of business). 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) 
(taxation). 
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 
(1977) (damages). 
Diamond National Corp. v. State  Board of Equalization, 425 
U.S. 268 (1976) (taxation). 
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (personal 
injury). 
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E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) 
(environmental regulation). 
E P A  v. California ex rel. S ta te  Water Resources Control 
Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (environmental regulation). 
Farmer v. Carpenters & Joiners Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) 
(labor-management) . 
FEA v. Algonquin Sng, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976) (government 
regulation of business). 
FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (government regu- 
lation of business). 
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326 
(1976) (government regulation of business). 
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association, 
426 U.S. 776 (1976) (government regulation of business). 
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) 
(taxation). 
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (environmental regu- 
lation). 
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 
738 (1976) (antitrust). 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (gov- 
ernment regulation of business). 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (government 
regulation of business). 
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (bankruptcy). 
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (federal-state). 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (environmental 
regulation). 
Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1977) (welfare). 
Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 
(1977) (labor-management) . 
Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wiscon- 
sin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) 
(labor -management). 
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (social security). 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (social security). 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (social security). 
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 
(1976) (taxation). 
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (dam- 
ages). 
National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics 
& Female Surgery, 425 U.S. 460 (1976) (damages). 
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N L R B  u. Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) (labor- 
management). 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) 
(federal-state) . 
New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976) (state-state). 
Nolde Brothers v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionary 
Workers, 430 U.S . 243 (1977) (labor-management) . 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollow breast, 425 U.S. 649 
(1976) (property rights). 
Norton v. Matthews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976) (social security). 
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers u. Mobile Oil Corp., 426 
U.S. 407 (1976) (labor-management) . 
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Coruallis Sand & Gravel 
Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (government regulation of business). 
Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U.S. 396 (1977) (taxation). 
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (dam- 
ages). 
Radzanower u. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (dam- 
ages). 
Ralston Purina Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 426 
U.S. 476 (1976) (government regulation of business). 
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976) (patent). 
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) 
(stockholdings) . 
South Prairie Construction Co. v. Local 627, International 
Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (labor- 
management). 
Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465 (1976) (state-state). 
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (environmen- 
tal regulation). 
United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 426 U.S. 500 
(1976) (government regulation of business). 
United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (taxa- 
tion). 
United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791 (1976) (federal-state). 
United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976) (tax- 
ation). 
United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 123 (1976) (personal in- 
jury ). 
[Jnited States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) (personal in- 
jury). 
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (taxation). 
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 
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U.S. 610 (1977) (antitrust). 
Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977) (labor-management). 
Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977) 
(taxation). 
23. Personal Liberty Cases 
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (civil rights). 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (civil liberties). 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Brown v. General Services Adrninstration, 425 U.S. 820 
(1976) (civil rights). 
Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (civil rights). 
City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (civil 
liberties). 
Codd u. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (civil liberties). 
Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy District, 
429 U.S. 651 (1977) (civil liberties). 
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Connor v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 675 (1976) (civil liberties). 
Costello v. Wainwright, 430 U. S. 325 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (civil liberties). 
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (criminal rights). 
East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 
(1976) (civil liberties). 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (civil rights). 
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (civil liberties). 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (civil rights). 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (criminal rights). 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (civil 
rights). 
Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976) (criminal 
rights). 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977) (civil liberties). 
Hampton v. Mow S u n  Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (civil liber- 
ties). 
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Educa- 
tion Association, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (civil liberties). 
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Hutto u. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Bagamas bad, 429 
U.S. 24 (1976) (civil liberties). 
Electrical Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 
U.S. 229 (1976) (civil rights). 
Jurek u. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) 
(civil rights). 
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U. S. 618 (1976) (criminal 
rights). 
Marks v. United States,  430 U.S. 188 (1977) (criminal 
rights). 
Mc Carthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 
U.S. 645 (1976) (civil liberties). 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 
273 (1976) (civil rights). 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Moore u. United States, 429 U.S. 20 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Morales v. Turman, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976) (civil liberties). 
N A A  CP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (civil rights). 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) 
(civil liberties). 
New York Civil Service Commission v. Sneed, 425 U.S. 457 
(1976) (civil liberties). 
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 
(1977) (civil liberties). 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (civil 
liberties). 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S . 242 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U .S. 736 (1976) (civil 
liberties). 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (civil rights). 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States & 
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (civil liberties). 
Singleton v. Wulff ,  428 U.S. 106 (1976) (civil liberties). 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (criminal 
rights). 
Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (civil liberties). 
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Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (criminal rights). 
Swain v. Bessley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Tennessee v. Dunlap, 426 U.S. 312 (1976) (civil liberties). 
Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, Inc., 
430 U.S. 259 (1977) (civil liberties). 
United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 
(1977) (civil liberties). 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (criminal rights). 
United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642 (1977) 
(civil liberties). 
United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 (1976) (criminal rights). 
United States  v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977) (criminal 
rights). 
United States v. Kopp, 429 U.S. 121 (1976) (criminal rights). 
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (criminal 
rights). 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (crim- 
inal rights). 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (criminal rights). 
United States  v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976) (criminal 
rights). 
United States v. Rose, 429 U.S. 5 (1976) (criminal rights). 
United States  v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 ('1976) (criminal 
rights). 
United States  v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (criminal 
rights). 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (civil rights). 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (criminal rights). 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (civil liberties). 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (criminal 
rights). 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) 
(civil liberties). 
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A. Economic Cases 
A judge was considered to have taken a liberal (conservative) 
position when he voted for (against) : 
1. The debtor in a bankruptcy suit. 
2. The regulatory agency or government in a business 
regulatory suit. 
3. The smaller of two businesses or the subcontractor in 
an exclusively business suit. 
4. The individual and against (for) the business. 
5. The consumer in a consumer-seller suit. 
6. The proenvironmentalist or government in an envi- 
ronmental suit. 
7. The insurance claimant. 
8. The labor union in a labor-management suit. 
9. The employee in an employee-labor union, employee- 
management, or employee-labor union and management 
dispute. 
10. The national union in a local-national union suit. 
11. The alleged patent or copyright infringer in a patent 
or copyright suit. 
12. The party alleging antitrust law violations. 
13. The injured party or party claiming damages in a 
personal injury or damage suit, or the party claiming the 
greater injury or damage in suits where both parties are 
seeking relief. 
14. The social security, welfare, or pension claimant. 
15. The individual stockholders in a stockholder- 
corporate suit. 
16. The government in taxation suits. 
17. The tenant in landlord-tenant litigation. 
18. The unemployed in unemployment compensation 
suits. 
19. The federal government in a suit against a state. 
20. The state in an inferior economic position in a suit 
against a state in a superior position. 
B. Personal Liberty Cases 
A judge was considered to have taken a liberal (conservative) 
position when he voted for (against): 
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1. The accused criminal defendant. 
2. The incarcerated prisoner seeking relief via petition. 
3. The expansion or broad interpretation of criminal 
rights. 
4. The party alleging the infringement of civil rights or 
liberties. 
